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CHARACTERISTICS OF
UNITED STATES ALARITIME LAW t
ARNOLD WHITMAN KNAUTH*
The maritime law of the United States is different in
several interesting aspects from that of the other leading
maritime nations. The history and nature of these differ-
ences have been frequently examined' but many important
changes have occurred as the law grows and changes under
the impetus of our great new American maritime activity.
It is therefore opportune to re-examine some of the more
important points, and especially those which have de-
veloped and changed during the past twenty or thirty
years. The following topics will be considered:
1. Basis and nature of the federal admiralty juris-
diction and its relation to the common law or
code jurisdiction of the States.
2. Nature of the maritime lien.
3. Practice in rem, including steps which can be
taken to release the res.
t This essay was originally contributed to the Revitsa del Diritto della
Navigazione, 1951 No. 1-2, Parte Prima, page 1, in a translation prepared
by Professor Torquato Carlo Giannini of the University of Rome. As thus
published, it was designed to contrast the United States admiraly law with
the system familiar to readers of that journal. It is republished here with
some modifications with the thought that it may be of some interest to
American lawyers whose practice lies outside the admiralty field and with
the realization that to the admiralty practitioner it will be elementary in
the extreme.
* Arnold W. Knauth; Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, New York
University; chairman of the Standing Committee on Admiralty and Mari-
time Law of the American Bar Association; editor of American Maritime
Cases; editor of Griffin on the American Law of Marine Collision; editor
of the 6th edition of Benedict on Admiralty; contributor of the annual
article on Transportation Law to the Annual Survey of American Law
(New York University).
I KENT, COMMzNTARIs, lecture 42; SPRAour., GROWTH op ADMiRALTY LAw,
1835-1935 In Law: A Century of Progress (1935) vol. 3, page 295; RoNaSo,
ADmnr&LTY (1940) see. 2; BEICNioT ON ADM=ALTY, (6th ed. 1940) vol. 4.
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4. Practice in personam with admiralty attachment
of property, including steps which can be taken
to release attached property.
5. Divided damages.
6. Some seamen's rights, including those of alien
seamen in foreign flag ships.
7. Sovereign immunity.
8. Death claims, as distinguished from claims for
bodily injury.
9. General Average and the negligence clause.
10. Limitation of shipowner's liability.
11. Finally, some reasons why litigants prefer to
utilize the methods and remedies of the maritime
law and the admiralty practice, in preference to
the land-wise methods of our common-law and
code-law courts.
The strong revival of shipping, both under the American
flag and under forty or fifty foreign flags, may give this
survey a practical value.2
The development of Admiralty jurisdiction and mari-
time law has been the subject of many studies by noted
American legal authors, and its history has been traced by
learned judges in their opinions. Earliest was Judge Bee,
who presided over the federal court in Charleston, South
Carolina in the years 1790-1812; his opinions carefully state
the European sources from which he derived the principles
'The sources of the statements here made may be consulted in several
volumes which have appeared since 1939, namely: RowNsoN's HANDBOOK OF
ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1940), which describes the sub-
stantive law, hereinafter cited "Robinson"; BENEsIcT's LAW OF AMEICAN
ADMIRALTY: ITS JUISDICTION AND PRACTICE, (6th ed. 1940) by KNAUTH3,
hereinafter cited "Benedict"; SPRAOUE AND HILEY'S CASES oN ADmgAx.y(1950), a collection of leading statutes and judicial decisions intendedprimarily for classroom instruction, hereinafter cited "Sprague & Healey";
KNAUTH'S AMERCAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING (3rd ed. 1947), de-
scribing the present situation of the Hague Rules, the Harter Act of 1893
and the American Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936; GRIFFIN ONCOLLISION (1949), hereinafter cited "Griffin"; and NoRRis ON THE LAW OF
SEAMEN (1951, Vol. 1; 1952, Vol. 2). The sixth volume of BENED Ic'r con-
tains a collection of the texts of 95 international treaties, conventions
and agreements, both multilateral and bilateral, which affect shipping in
international trade, with references to many more touching the work of
consuls, the fisheries, imports and exports, taxation and related matters.
The literature has been prolific, and examination of the sources might
require a library of several hundred volumes.
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for his decisions. In New England and on the Supreme
Court, Justice Story, in the years 1811-1845, expounded the
historical sources of the American maritime law. Of him,
Professor Parsons wrote in 1859:
"Story could not find all the true or original prin-
ciples of admiralty or of the law of shipping in English
law; he followed the lead of Mansfield and went where
they could be found - went to continental Europe....
He went with a freer step than MansfielcL" '
His opinion in De Lovo v. Boit delivered in 1815, remains
a classic.
The first edition of Abbott on Shipping, printed in
London in 1802, was well known to the early American
judges; and the preface of that great work (which passed
through 12 editions in 80 years) directs the student to the
sources of maritime law in these words:
".... the absence of a general and established code
of maritime law (in England), which almost every
other European nation possesses, seems to render a
collection of the principal points of that law pecurliarly
necessary."5
and he points to the Mediterranean codes, to the laws of
Oleron and Wisbuy, the works of Cleirac and others. In
1821, Hall's American Law Journal presented a complete
translation of the French Ordinance de la Marine of Louis
XIV - the Colbert Code of 1681. Dunlap's volume on
admiralty practice appeared in 1836, with a second edition
in 1850. Judge Bett's more authon~tative book appeared in
1838, and Oliver's forms in 1842. The work of formulating
the General Admiralty Rules of Practice was commenced
in 1842, and, under the inspiration of Judge Betts, went
into effect in 1844. Conkling's book appeared in 1848, and
Benedict's first edition in 1850.6 Judge Marvin's unsur-
passed work on Wreck and Salvage came in 1858. Parsons,
the Dane Professor of Harvard Law School and teacher of
the youthful Holmes, published his trio of masterly works
PARSONS, LAW or MAamMu PBoPKmry A") CONTnACTS (1859) p. 17.
'Fed. Cas. No. 3,776, 2 Gall. 398 (1815).
'Amno'r oN SHIPPING (12th ed. 1880) preface to 1st ed.
'BENEDICT ow ADmIALT (1st ed. 1850), (6th ed. 1940).
19531
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in 1859, 1868 and 1869T The second edition of Benedict
followed in 1870; and all the federal shipping statutes were
re-examined and re-stated in the Revised Statutes of 1872-
78. Lowell's Decisions (1871-77) and Benedict's Reports
(1877-78) were soon followed by the century collection of
the Federal Cases (1780-1880) which included many mari-
time reports previously available only in manuscript.
This stream of publication subsided in 1880, and in the
next 40 years there were only the rather simple Handbook
of Admiralty by Hughes, and two further editions of Bene-
dict, and a handful of essays in the law reviews. This period
coincided with the low ebb of United States flag shipping.
But there was no dearth of sound learning in the judicial
opinions of the period. Judge Addison Brown in New York
(1881-1900), Judge Hughes in Virginia (1874-1900), Justices
Blatchford (1867-1893), and Henry Billings Brown (1875-
1910), on the Supreme Court were presently re-enforced
by Justice Holmes (1902-1932) whose opinion in The
Blackheath in 1904 displayed ample knowledge of the his-
tory and the principles of the maritime law. Curiously, he
used a phrase in that opinion which has often been mis-
quoted out of its context; he said that "The precise scope of
admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious principle
or of very accurate history." These words have often been
repeated to indicate that the maritime law as a whole is
not founded on broad and sound principles, which is quite
the opposite of the truth. Many years later, he uttered
another much-quoted phrase in The Western Maid:9
"In deciding this question (whether a maritime lien,
although dormant while the Government is in posses-
sion of a vessel, becomes enforceable as soon as the
vessel comes into hands that could be sued) we must
realize that however ancient may be the traditions of
maritime law, however diverse the sources from which
it has been drawn, itderives its whole and only power
in this country from its having been accepted and
'PARSONS, ON THz Law op MArrlMz PRoP TY AND CoNTucs (1859),
2 vols.; o MARINE IN1sUBANCZ AND GEN=AL AvERAGE (1868), 2 vols.; oN
271 LAW or SHPViNG AND A~rnwrLr (1869), 2 vols.
0 195 U. a. 861 (1904).
'257 U. S. 419,432 (192) ; parenthetical material added.
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adopted by the United States. There is no mystic over-
law to which even the United States must bow."
This of course is the legal fact in every sovereign state.
The customs of merchants and the law of the sea, however,
are not a mystery, and all trading nations do pay careful
heed to them.1 0 Another phrase which he coined has been
much disputed, namely that "the maritime law is not a
corpus Juris - it is a very limited body of customs and
ordinances of the sea."" Those words were written in
dissent, and they seem quite inaccurate; for the maritime
law deals with every sort of tort, of contract, and of crime,
relating to ships and shipping; and it has broad powers of
an equitable nature as well, while its limitation procedure
is akin to a composition in bankruptcy.
Other judges of the recent half century have displayed
a strong interest in the maritime law: Justice McfReynolds
in the Supreme Court proclaimed the necessity for a unified
law for shipping in a series of powerful opinions;"' in the
lower appellate courts, Judges Rogers,18 Hough,"4 Ward,
Learned Hand, Augustus N. Hand, Rose, Hutcheson, Soper,
Denman, Magruder, and many more have delivered notable
opinions concerning the history and principles of maritime
law. In the courts of first instance, many judges in the
seaports have been learned in the law maritime: Judges
Coxe, Campbell, Woolsey, among others in New York,
Chesnut and Coleman in Baltimore, Way in Norfolk, Fee
in Oregon. Since 1920 the stream of literature has been
renewed; the American Maritime Cases were commenced
in 1923; new editions of Benedict, extensively revised,
appeared in 1925 and 1940; Professors Lord and Sprague
published a collection of selected cases in 1925, with two
subsequent editions; Professor Robinson's excellent work
on Admiralty Law came in 1940, and Knauth's Ocean Bills
"0RoBNsov, p. 5; G. L. Canfield, Note, 20 Mich. L Rev. 533, 535 (1922).
u Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 218, at 22D (1917)
(dis. op.).
"Ibid, 205; KnIckerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U, S. 149 (1920) ; State
of Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924).
1The Allianca (Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson), 1923 A. M. C. 798, 289 Fed.
Rep. 964 (2nd Cir., 1923).




of Lading (1937,1940 and 1947) and Griffin's American Law
of Collision (1950) and Poor's work on Charter-parties
(1920, 1930 and 1949) and Congdon's General Average
(1923) have become well known. There has been no lack
of scholarly research into the sources, history and prin-
ciples of the maritime law and the admiralty jurisdiction
in America throughout the period since the Republic was
founded in 1789.
1. BAsis Alm NATURE OF THE FEDERAL
MAItnrVd JumDmcTroN
An operative system of justice must consider three
aspects: first, jurisdiction of the persons sought to be con-
trolled and of the subject-matter of their lawsuit; next, a
set of rules of substantive law, stating rights and duties;
and third a system of practice - adjective or procedural
law - stating the methods, sanctions and penalties by
which they may work out their respective rights and duties
in court.
This becomes quite a complicated matter when two or
more sovereign states may have conflicting or over-lapping
jurisdictions, statements of substantive law, and systems
of practice. In a federal Union of States, such as ours, these
difficulties are capable of adjustment by means of the
common Constitution with its federal legal structure. In
many ways the federal legal power is limited. One of its
unlimited aspects is its power in admiralty and maritime
matters.
The maritime law is an exclusively federal law and
when that federal maritime law is applied and administered
in the admiralty court it is an exclusively federal practice.
The influence of the States and of State Law and practice
is very small. The reason is simple. The maritime com-
merce is predominantly international and interstate, and
requires a single rule of law for the whole nation.15 The
federal District courts find the maritime law and the limits
of "admiralty jurisdiction" in history and custom. They
The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U. S., 1874) ; Southern Pacific Co..v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917).
[VOL. XIII
1953] U. S. MARITIME LAW 7
make such rules of practice as they find needful.16 A United
States judge sitting in Admiralty presents a position rarely
found in the modern world - a court with constitutional
power to find the law where it pleases largely unaided
by any code or statute, and to regulate its practice as it
pleases.?
The customary and historical sources of maritime law
are a blend of all the European traditions: - Amalfi, Bar-
celona, Oleron, and Hanseatic cities, Wisbuy, the Colbert
Code of 1681, the English admiralty prior to 1789. This is
The'independence of admiralty judges is shown by the fact that they
operated the court from 1789 to 1844 - for 55 years - without any General
Rules. The Magnolia, 20 How. 296 (U. S., 1858) ; Dowling v. Isthmilan B.S.
Corp., 1950 A. M. C. 1876, 184 F. 2d 758 (3rd Cir., 1950) ; Hough, Admiralty
Jurtadiction - 07 Late Yeara, mupra, n. 14.
" Woolsey, D. J., said: "Admiralty jurisdiction is plastic. It is largely
Judge-made, and consequently is not technicaL" The Supreme Court has
rule-making power: 28 U. S. 0. 2073.
The rules are collected in BENEir, 6th ed., voL 5.
Statutes eztending the federal admiralty jurisdiction:
February 25, 1845, 5 Stat. 728 (extending jurisdiction to the Great
Lakes). See The Eagle, 8 WaiL 15 (U. S., 1868), declaring the
statute superfluous.
March 3,1851, R. S. 4282, 46 U. S. C. 182-189 (establishing the system
of limitation of shipowners' liability). This is described in detail
In BwnicT, voL 3, ch. XLIX.
June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. 1000-1006, 46 U. S. C. 911-984 (establishing
the Uen of the Preferred Ship Mortgage for U. S. - flag vessels).
Upheld in The Thomas Barium and John J. Barium, 1934 A. M. 0.
1417, 293 U. S. 21 (1934), overthrowing the rule of Bogart v. The
John Jay, 17 How. 399 (U. S., 1854).
June 23, 1910 and June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. 1005, 46 U. S. C. 971-974(regulating rank of maritime liens). Upheld in Piedmont Coal Co.
v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U. S. 1 (1920), overthrowing the
contrary rule of The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438 (U. S., 1819).
0. Griflin, The Federal Maritime Lien Act, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 15(1923), 1924 A. M. C. 206.
March 30, 1920, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. 761-766 (establishing a
cause of action for wrongful death on the high seas). Applied in
The Windrush, 1925 A. M. C. 150, 5 F. 24 425 (2nd Cir., 1924),
overthrowing the doctrine of The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (1907).
March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. 901 (establishing a federal
workmen's compensation system for injured harbor workers and
longshoremen - but not for shipmasters and seamen). Upheld in
Knudsen's case, 1932 A. M. C. 355, 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
June 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 496, 46 U. S. C. 740, 1948 A. M, C. 1502(extending admiralty jurisdiction to damage done by a ship to per-
sons and property on land). Upheld in AUI-America Cables v. 8.S.
Dieppe, 1950 A. M. C. 1863, 93 F. Supp. 923 (S. D. N. Y., 1950).
Amer. Bridge Co. v. The Gloria 0, 1951 A. M. C. 1388, 98 F. Supp.
71 (EL D. N. Y., 1951).
Statutes restricting admiralty jurisdiction:
October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395, 28 U. S. C. 41 (3) (permitting work-
men's compensation Statutes of the 48 states to apply to persons
injured on board vessels while working on territorial waters of
the states). Declared invalid In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
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referred to as "the general maritime law of nations '""h and
it is the broad basis of the maritime and commercial law
of the present times in all the trading nations. In the
United States, this "general maritime law" means the laws
and customs which prevailed before the independence of
the United States in 1775-1789. The reader will notice that
the U. S. judges do not consider the Code Napoleon as a
historical source of our law. Nor have they regarded any
of the more modern Codes as authentic sources of our
maritime law. The 19th Century codes of France, Italy,
Spain, the Netherlands, the 19th Century reforms in Eng-
land, the German Code of 1900, or the work of the Comit&
Maritime International since 1897, despite their now vener-
able age, are not yet "history" and do not yet express
"custom".
As the year 1789 has gradually receded into the nearer
past, the peculiar American blend of all traditions of 1789
has been developed through judicial decisions.
Here we trace the growth of a series of self-proclaimed
extensions and self-imposed limitations on admiralty juris-
diction, law and practice which represent a genius differ-
ing in many details from the codes and decisions of other
maritime jurists of the same century and a half in other
nations. The following enumeration will quickly indicate
the nature of these differences as they affect the daily
work of the courts and the methods of conducting mari-
time business.
As to torts, admiralty jurisdiction is limited to those
which occur in ships which are afloat and which are mari-
time in the geographical sense, namely occurring on the
253 U. S. 149 (1920). A re-phrased statute of similar purport was
declared invalid in 1924, whereafter Congress complied with the
Supreme Court's view by enacting the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 33 U. S. C. 901. This in-
cident illustrates the power of the Judiciary, under the admiralty
power, to force its views upon the Legislature. See Goodrich:
Yielding Place to the New: - Rest v. Motion in the Conflict of
Laws, 50 Col. L. Rev. 881 (1950).
IKENT, CommENTARrES (1826), vol. 1, p. 380, lecture 42. The Magnolia,
supra, n. 16; The Lottawanna, supra, n. 15; The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158
(1903) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra, n. 15; Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 (1918) ; Dowling v. Isthmian S.S. Co., supra, n. 16;
Doucette v. Vincent, 1952 A. M. C. 458, 465, 194 F. 2d 834, 839 (1st Cir.,
1952), (opinion of Magruder, C. J.) ; See RomNsoN, sec. 2.
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water.1' Yet there are some curious fictions, such as the
rule that a drydock from which the water has been with-
drawn remains a place in the water. 0 Until quite recently,
tort claims growing out of injury done by a ship to objects
on land were not regarded as maritime and many hair-
splitting decisions resulted. This was changed by statute
in 1948.21 The new test is "damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwith-
standing that such damage or injury be done or consum-
mated on land".
As to contracts, the test of jurisdiction is the maritime
character of the contract, and not the place where it is
made or performed.22 Here again we find some curious
fictions, such as the holding that a mortgage of a ship is
not a maritime transaction but only a banker's business on
land.2" This troublesome rule, which the Comit6 Maritime
reformed by its Liens and Mortgages Convention of 1926,1A
was partly reformed in 1920, by the Preferred Ship Mort-
gage Act, as to United States flag vessels.25 Shipbuilding
contracts are held not maritime but terrene, and a ship
launched but not yet completed is not yet a vessel within
the admiralty jurisdiction.28 Against this rule there has
"RomNsoN, see. 9, p. 56; Bwmmicr, vol. 1, p. 349; Spimeuz & HmALY, pp.
51-54; The Blackheath, aupra, n. 8.
0 Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McManigal (Geyer's Case), 1944 A. M. C. 377, i39
F. 2d 939 (4th Cir., 1944) ; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Branham (Phillips' Case),
1943 A. M. C. 1419, 136 F. 2d 873 (4th Cir., 1943).
Act of June 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 496, 46 U. S. Code 740, 1948 A. M. C. 1502.
See SPUAGu. & HEALy, p. 55; Knauth, The Landward Extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction, 35 Cornell L. Q. 1 (1949); Bergren, Effects of Recent Legis-
lation upon the Admiralty Law, 17 George Wash. L. Rev. 353 (1949) ; Rault,
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 24 Tulane L. Rev. 453 (1950) ; Fauver,
The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction to Include Amphibious Torts, 87
Georgetown L. J. 252 (1949).
" "Contract" jurisdiction: RomesoN, sees. 19, 20, 21; BU Icxr, voL 1. p.
123; SPRAGUS & HXALY, pp. 15, 57, 69 (n. 43) ; The Meteor, 1950 A. M. 0.
2029, 184 F. 2d 439 (2nd Cir., 1950).
21 Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How. 399 (U. S., 1854) ; The Secundus, 1926
A. M. C. 1414, 15 F. 2d 713 (E. D. N. Y., 1926) ; 1927 A. M. C. 641; See Lord
& Glenn, The Foreign Ship Mortgage, 56 Yale L. J. 923 (1947).
N Comitd Maritime International: Convention on Maritime Liens and
Mortgages, Brussels, 1926; text in Bix=icr, vol. 6, p. 78; also at 13 Dor,
Revue de Droit Maritime Compard, 535. See Pmcz oN M.Arrmz Lurs,
London, 1940, p. 239.
0 Preferred Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (for U. S. flag ships), 41 Stat. 1000,
46 U. S. C. 911.
SRomsox, see. 19, p. 163; BxmsDiaT, vol. 1, pp. 30, 143, 146;, SPYAGum &
HALT, p. 68, n. 42.
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been a good deal of protest.2 A newly launched hull, being
shifted across a harbor, can be in a collision. One may
wonder whether a ship that splits in two is one ship, two
ships, or not a ship at all.
We do not distinguish between the oceans, the coasts,
the great sounds and bays, the Great Lakes and the numer-
ous rivers; all are alike waters to which our admiralty
jurisdiction and our maritime law apply; there is in the
United States no "droit fluvial", such as is familiar in
Europe. And indeed this responds to a practical fact, for
ocean steamers ascend our rivers to very great distances
in every-day navigation, whereas none of Europe's rivers
are navigated by ocean vessels for more than a few miles
from the sea, as to Rouen on the Seine, Antwerp and
Rotterdam on the branches of the Rhine and Meuse delta,
Bremerbaven and Hamburg on the Weser and Elbe deltas.
Consequently Europe has a "river law" very different from
its maritime law; but in the United States there is one single
maritime law and jurisdiction wherever there is navigable
water.
An admiralty court may divide damages and fault
equally, but not in proportion to fault28 as is generally done
in the maritime law of other countries. This rustic rule
has often been debated, and opinion concerning it seems
to be equally divided - like the rule itself.
The ancient rule that "death is the composer of strife"
in the sense that damages are not given for negligent harm
resulting in death, has been entirely abrogated by a series
of statutes, but after 100 years \the ancient rule is still
perversely regarded as fundamental.u
Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction - Of Late Year, aupra, u. 14.
Gxxmwn 1§245-249; ROBINsoN, se. 115; Huger, The Proportional Dam-
age Rule In Collisions At Sea, 13 Cornell L. Q. 531 (1928) ; SPUAGU , Divided
Damages, 6 N. Y. Univ. L. Q. Rev. 15 (1928); Louis Franck: A New Lawfor the Seas, 42 L. Q. Rev. (London) 25 (1926); Mole & Wilson, A Study of
Oomparative Negligence, 17 Cornell L. Q. 333, 604 (1932) ; The Margaret -
The Manchester Merchant, 1929 A. M. C. 1 and 307, 30 F. 2d 923 (3rd
Cir., 1929).
OThe Miramar, 1929 A. M. 0. 234, 31 F. 2d 767 (S. D. N. Y., 1929); dis-
approved in Nordquist v. U. S. Trust Co., 1951 A. M. C. 1092, 188 F. 2d 776(2nd Cir, 1951) ; of. Taylor v. Atlantic Mar. Co., 1950 A. M. C. 352 and 737
(reh'g.), 181 F. 2d 84 (2nd Cir., 1950).
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A "maritime lien" - the jus in rem - secret, inchoate,
and unrecorded, may be enforced at any time against the
ship in rem unless there is such delay and change in the
circumstances as to permit the equitable defense of laches;*
this flexible rule has been found to be adaptable to many
different situations.
The United States rule as to the liability of carriers by
sea to shippers, as found in statutory form in the Harter
and Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts, is essentially the same
as the Hague rules or Brussels Convention on Ocean Bills
of Lading.81L On the other hand the United States law as to
limitation of a shipowner's liability does not resemble that
of any other maritime nation; some of its characteristics
are discussed at another point in this article.
This rapid review will warn the reader that it is unsafe
to suppose that the maritime law of the United States is
just like that of Europe, or South America, or even closely
like that of Britain and Canada, although the historic and
customary foundations of modem European and American
law are, in a broad sense, the same.
2. THE NATUm OF T MAITM LEN
In United States admiralty practice, the maritime lien
and the right in rem - jus in rem - are closely identified
and exist together. The right in rem is only available to
enforce a maritime lien, and only against the identical ship,
cargo or freight money concerned. The details of this prac-
tice are quite different from those now prevailing in Eng-
land or in the British Commonwealths. In the United
States, a right in rem may be asserted against a ship with-
out any regard for the presence or absence of the owner
or agent; the ship will be arrested in rem by the Marshal
of the federal court even if the shipowner is standing at the
spot and offering to give an appearance in the lawsuit An
arrest of this character can only be released by paying the
o RowINsoN, sec. 55; BENMDCcT, vol. 3, P. 297; Van Patten v. Panama R.R.
Co., 1950 A. M. C. 267, 178 F. 2d 406 (2nd Cir., 1949).
m See KNAUTH ON OcPAN BiLLS op LADING, (3rd ed 1947), pp. 126, 129.
UPwacs, oN MAnrrmwa LENs, (London 1940); RomNsoN, ses. 48-62;
BF E1ICT, vol. 8, p. 297; Willard, Priorities Among Maritime Liens, 16
Cornell L. Q. 522 (1931).
1953]
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sum demanded or by furnishing adequate security as a
pledge to pay whatever the court shall decree to be payable.
The security may not exceed twice the amount fairly
claimed to be payable; the excess sum is available for legal
costs and for legal interest (at 6 per cent in most courts,
and at 7 per cent on the Pacific Coast) from the date when
the lawsuit is commenced or, in some cases, from the date
when the debt arose. The right in rem is necessarily limited
to the value of the res; if a person with a good claim for
$10,000 brings a suit in rem against a ship which has a value
of only $8,000, the security and the decree cannot exceed
$8,000. A right in personam (described in the next section)
is not so limited in amount, and may be enforced against
the debtor's future property as well as against his present
property. Ordinarily there is no time limit for asserting
any secret maritime lien, except laches. A few time limits
have been imposed by treaty or by statutes: 2 years for
salvage,3 and for death on the high seas;8 1 year for Bills
of Lading.5 In deciding what is reasonable time, the courts
will look at the time-limitation statutes of the States in
which they sit for analogies."6
The ranking of liens when questions of priorities be-
tween competing lien claimants arise is in a somewhat con-
fused state. As a general rule, the last lien in point of time
outranks prior liens - the exact reverse of the common law
rule - on the theory either that the most recent service to
the ship has preserved it as an asset for the benefit of prior
lien claimants or that one in whose favor a lien has attached
to a ship has thereby acquired an interest in the ship sub-
ject to liens subsequently arising.8 7 However, certain classes
of liens (such as seamen's wages and salvage) are accorded
priority over others regarded as of lesser dignity, so that
the ranking depends somewhat upon custom. Also, the
statutory preferred ship mortgage is given priority over
liens arising subsequent in time to its recording and en-
" 46 U. S. C. 730.
" 46 U. S. C. 763.
- 46U. S. C. 1803 (6).
" See note 30.
" Willard, PrMorities Among Mar*ime Mens, supra, n. 32; RomINSON, see.
61 ; BuzNzcr, voL 3, p. 297.
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dorsement, except as to liens for wages, salvage, general
average, and tort claims, thus bringing in the common law
rule of priority to the one first in time to this extent. Liens
for necessaries and supplies furnished in the home port
were formerly not recognized,u but this rule was hanged
by statute in 1910." For seagoing ships, liens are 4zsuaUy
grouped by the voyage;40 in the larger harbors, thy are
ranked by forty day periods;41 and in various inland Waters
they are grouped by the season or by the year.4
The United States admiralty courts may increased or
decrease the kinds of claims which are regarded as giving
rise to a maritime lien enforceable in ren. A recent e0-
ample of the extension of the maritime secret lien by juris-
prudence, unaided by statute or historical precedent, is aii
follows: the court gave a cargo owner a lien on the ship
for refund of freight money several months after the freight
had been paid and the cargo delivered, because the con-
tract provided that the shipowner would refund part of the
freight if it should be proved that similar cargo was carried
by a rival ship for a lesser freight. '
A recent example of the denial of a lien arose out of the
question whether an old ship, retired from service, should
be held liable in rem for the daily hire of the wharf where
she was moored and for the service of painters who painted
her; it was successfully argued that she had been with-
drawn from commerce and had, as it was said, become a
"dead ship", so that the liens were denied." The border
line between lien and no-hen cases is always open for argu-
ment, and the Judges may be persuaded to extend or reduce
the classes of torts or of contracts which give rise to the
maritime lien.
As the maritime lien is secret and unrecorded, the pur-
chaser of a ship should always be careful to obtain an assur-
0 The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438-(U. S., 1819).
41 Stat 1005; 46 U. S. 0. 971.
See wnzuDn, op. oit., note 47; RonrNsow, p. 425; Bzminnc, vol. 3, p. 297.
a The Interstate No. 1, 1923 A. M. C. 1118, 290 Fed. 926 (2nd Cir., 1923).
"The Portchester, 1932 A. M. C. 414, 56 F. 2d 579 (2nd Cir., 1932).8 Krauss Lumber Co. v. Dimon S.S. Co., 1933 A. M. C. 1578, 290 U. S. 117
(1933).
" The Meteor, 1950 A. M. C. 2029, 184 F. 2d 439 (2nd Cr., 1950).
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ance that the ship is free of secret liens, as well as recorded
liens, and that the seller will defend and pay for any liens
asserted-against the ship and arising prior to the sale.
3. PnAcrIcE iN REM
One who claims a maritime lien, secret or recorded, files
a libel in the federal court in the district where the ship
is or where it is expected to arrive. The libel names and
describes the ship, the cargo or the freight money in ques-
tion and must be verified by the libelant. He furnishes the
clerk with a deposit or guarantee (known as the stipulation
or stip), usually $250, for court sts; this amount may
later be enlarged if the costs exceed that sum. No other
bond orsecurity is given at that time by the libellant. After
the clerk issues the process and monition, the Marshal goes
on board the ship, or to the place where the cargo lies
or where the freight money is deposited; he takes posses-
sion, and leaves a caretaker or watchman to enforce his
authority. He posts on the ship the copy of the monition
(popularly known as the "sticker"); this is usually affixed
at the gangway, on the door of the Master's office or cabin,
at the mainmast, or at some other conspicuous place where
public notices about the ship's affairs are displayed. He
forbids any movement of the ship. Sometimes he takes
awaythe ship's anchor, or a portion of the machinery, to
make sure that there will be no attempt to escape.
Release of an arrest in rem may be quickly accom-
plished. The shipmaster or agent informs the shipowner,
who nbtifies his underwriter and causes a bond or stipula-
tion for security to be furnished. The security may not ex-
ceed twice the amount of the damages claimed, and it may
not exceed the value of the res. The libellant and his proc-
tor usually agree to a bond or stipulation for about 110%
or 125% of the damages claimed; the Clerk will act accord-
ing to such an agreement. Quite often the libellant agrees
to release the ship upon a proctor's promise that a bond
is being arranged and will be given at an early date. It is
also common to file a claim for a ship and give an appear-
ance and a bond or stipulation in lieu of the ship before the
(VOL. XIII
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ship arrives; and in such a case the court will proceed with
the case, even though it may turn out that the ship never
arrived in the jurisdiction at all. This practice saves much
time and inconvenience when busy ships are in part for
only a few hours, perhaps on a holiday, when the arranging
of security is difficult.
As soon as security is arranged, the Marshal takes away
his notices, and the vessel may proceed freely about her
business, while the lawsuit continues against the security
in lieu of the ship.
Sometimes the shipowner prefers to leave the ship in
the custody of the Marshal until the case is tried and de-
cided. Some well-known instances of this practice are The
Navemar, a Spanish steamer for whose possession the Bar-
celona government and the Franco government contested
during the Spanish civil war;"5 The Poznan, a chartered
Polish vessel which was alleged to be liable for losses
suffered by a cargo arranged by the charterer;" The Arauca,
a German steamer against which cargo claims were asserted
as she lay in a port of refuge in the first year of the recent
war, 1939-1941;47 and The Caribe, ex-Alacran, a Colombian
vessel arrested during a passage of the Panama Canal be-
cause of cargo claims against her sister-ship, The Cali"
These and other examples show the necessity of an agree-
ment with the Marshal -for watching and anchorage or
wharfage fees at the lowest possible rate; for while these
charges are paid in the first instance by the arresting party,
they will be paid in the end by the party losing the lawsuit,
who may be the shipowner.
4. PRAcTic iN PESONAm wrTH
ADimcnALTY ATTAcmwwT
If the respondent in an admiralty suit is absent and
cannot be found at his usual place of business, the U. S. A.
admiralty practice permits the maritime creditor to file an
- 1938 A. M. C. 15,303 U. S. 68 (1938).
1927 A. M. C. 723, 274 U. S. 117 (1927).
"1940 A. M. C. 860 (S. D. Fla., 1940).
48 Swift & Co. v. Companla Colombiana del Carlbe, 1950 A. M. 0. 1089, 339
U. B. 684 (1950).
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admiralty libel in personam with a prayer for a writ of
admiralty attachment (referred to as a writ of "foreign"
attachment, but quite different from the common-law writ
of assistance usually called a "foreign" attachment). With
this writ the Marshal may arrest any property of the re-%
spondent - the ship herself, or any sister-ship, or any bank
account or credit, or any chattel or other thing, on land or
afloat.' But if the vessel-owner is present so that personal
service can be made on him, then this right of attachment
instantly disappears. Thus in practice it is useful chiefly
against the owners of tramp-ships who do not maintain
permanent agents in United States ports; it is not useful
against liner companies whose agencies have offices always
open for business and ready to receive service of a libel
in personam. This is a sharp remedy, and when it functions
it is operated in general like the process in rem described
above.
The libellant may combine a libel in rem with a libel in
personam and pray in the alternative for both forms of
relief. This is very commonly done. In the end, of course,
the libellant may receive only one payment, whether in rem
or in personam.
To accomplish an admiralty attachment, the libellant
must avoid notifying the shipowner in advance of his pur-
pose, for if the shipowner causes a personal appearance to
be filed with the Clerk after the libel is filed but before the
Marshal can find the property to be attached, the attach-
ment will fail altogether.
The release of an attachment is accomplished by the
same steps already described for the release of an arrest on
process in rem.
5. DxVED DAMAGrs AND CARGo's RIGHTS
Where there is mutual fault United States admiralty
courts will divide both fault and damages, but only on one
basis - namely half and half if there are two parties, or
'The Melmay, 1932 A. M. C. 1396 (C. Z., 1932),-1934 A. M. C. 1488 (S. D.
N. Y., 1934); The Caribe, 8upra, n. 48; The Chief Capiilano, 1931 A. M. C.
1089 (W. D. Wash., 1931) ; BENEsmior, vol. 2, pp. 103, 350.
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in thirds if there are three parties.50 Several efforts have
been made to introduce the British and Brussels rule of
liability proportioned to the fault, but without success.51
The President sent the Brussels Collision Convention of
1910 to the Senate for its advice and consent as to ratifica-
tion, but the Senate failed to act for many years, and in
1949 the President recalled it. 52 No action is now contem-
plated. Thus we perpetuate the long-existing situation
whereby the plaintiff often has a free choice between the
two systems of law as to divided damages, and may by
suing in Europe or in America seek whichever rule of law
he prefers by a suitable choice of the forum. It would seem
that this option is desired by a large sector of the business
and insurance community.
If the parties agree to settle a case on an apportionment
basis, the courts are willing to enter the appropriate decrees
and to divide the damages in the same proportions.5
In the United States it is also settled law that the cargo
is "innocent" of the navigational faults of the ship in which
it is carried, and therefore may recover its full loss against
a colliding ship which is only partly at fault." This is of
course the opposite of the rule of the Brussels Convention
and the English admiralty, which allow cargo to recover
only the same percentage as the fault of the colliding ship.
Until very recently it was possible, however, to attain the
same result by inserting a "both to blame" clause in the
bill of lading, but such clauses have now been held invalid
by the Supreme Court.55
51 GnFpzN, sees. 245-249; The Voco - The Choapa, 1960 A. M. C. 1552, 93
F. S. 718 (S. D. N. Y., 1950). Damages divided equally among six vessels at
fault, The Norwich Victory, 1949 A. M. C. 2D40, 175 F. 2d 556 (3rd Cir.,
1950). Canada applies the English rule of proportional division according
to fault: The Chinook - The Dagmar Salen, 1950 A- X C. 729, (Br. Col.,
1950).
The Margaret - The Manchester Merchant, supra, n. 28; The Nash-
bulk - The Rutgers Victory, 1950 A. M. C. 1293, at 1300 (dis. op.), 183 F.
2d 405, 410 (2nd Cir., 1950) ; The Mandu - The Denderah, 1940 A. M. C.
1150, 114 F. 2d 361 (2nd Cir., 1940).
1947 A. M. C. 832.
"Connolly Co. v. U. S., 1950 A. M. C. 1778 (S. D. Cal., 1950).
"The Atlas, 93 U. S. 8302 (1876) ; The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540 (1899).
United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 72 S. Ct. Rep. 666 (1952) (often




Seamen are frequently referred to as "wards of the
admiralty court"* In a long delayed effort to give seamen
ample protection from abuse by harsh employers and
officers, a most complicated system of seamen's rights and
remedies has been created since 1915. One commentator
has spoken of this situation as "the tangled skein",56 and
the phrase is apt. More than one-third of the maritime
litigation of recent years arises out of the effort to adjust
the rights of sick, injured and socially unadjusted seamen
through the machinery of the courts. While most of this
effort relates to seamen in United States flag vessels, a
substantial part also concerns ships of foreign flags.
In general, every seaman is always entitled to "mainte-
nance, cure and wages" to the end of the voyage, and some-
times much longer; and he may also receive money in-
demnity for negligent injury. After leaving the ship, a sick
or injured seaman receives "maintenance" as long as he is
incapacitated and hopeful of cure or betterment in his situ-
ation;57 this is true even though the sickness or injury was
occasioned while the seaman was on shore leave and not
performing any duty for his ship, so long as he can be still
regarded as in the ship's service at the time."' Maintenance
is often received by remaining on board the ship or by
entering a free federal "marine hospital". "Care and cure",
means medical care, surgery and nursing and this is usually
given at the free "marine hospital". The sick or injured
seaman receives wages until he is discharged or until the
end of the voyage, whichever happens first. These are
ancient rights, now restated in International Labor Office
Convention No. 55, which the United States has ratified and
made effective, October 29, 1939.11 Until the present, there
has been no implementing legislation of the Convention.
B 55 Yale L.J. 584 (1946).
"Farrell v. U. S., 1949 A. M. C. 613, 336 U. S. 511 (1949) ; Murphy v.
American Barge Line, 1949 A. M. C. 158, 169 F. 2d 61 (3rd Cir., 1948) ;
McKeefry v. U. S., 1950 A. M. C. 1806 (D. D. Pa., 1950) ; Shields v. U. S.,
1949 A. M. C. 1355, 175 F. 2d 743 (3rd Cir., 1949).
0Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 1943 A. M. C. 451, 318 U. S. 724 (1943);
Warren v. United States, 1951 A. M. C. 416, 340 U. . 523 (1951).
- Internat. Labor Office Convention No. 55; BENIcT, vol. 6, p. 294; 1938
A. M. C. 1297 ; 1939 A. M. C. 1591.
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A seaman of any nationality in an American flag vessel-
whom we may call a "domestic" seaman - may be entitled
to sue his employer for injuries on either of two theories,
which were originally quite distinct but are now tending
to merge together: (a) if the injury was due to the vessel
being unseaworthy - a right given under the general mari-
time law and (b) if one of his fellow-seamen was negli-
gent - a right not recognized by the general maritime law
but given by the so-called Jones Act of 1920. The two ideas
tend to merge when the unseaworthy condition is caused
by negligence, as when a piece of unseaworthy rope is
selected for use by a fellow seaman. Again, from 1920 to
about 1940 it was the general view that an injured seaman,
entitled to claim both the Jones Act "negligence" remedy
and the "unseaworthiness" remedy of the general maritime
law, must choose or "elect" whether to claim unseaworthi-
ness or negligence; but recently it has been said that he
may proceed to the trial of his case on both grounds at the
same time, and recover a verdict if he proves one or the
other.6 Under either system, there may be very large
awards of damages.61 The merchant seamen in United
States merchant ships are not limited or governed by any
system of social insurance for sickness, injury or death.
A seaman in a ship of foreign flag is, as a general proposi-
tion, not touched by the American law," but to this there
are many exceptions. It has been decided that a seaman in a
ship of Panamanian or Honduran flag, owned by American
citizens and operated in a service at American ports, may
have the same rights against his employers as. though he
were serving in a domestic ship of United States registry."
And when a Greek ship (during the German occupation of
Greece) was sailing on the American coast and obtained
some of the crew at American ports, it was decided that
such men, when injured in American coastal waters, should
40Thomsen v. The Dorene B., 1950 A. M. C. 1412, 91 F. Supp. 549 (S. D.
Cal., 1950). Contra: Reed v. The Arkansas, 1950 A. M. 0. 1410, 88 F. Supp.
993 (S. D. Cal., 1950).
9 The NACCA Journal (semi-annual, since 1948) published by the
National Association of Compensation Claimants' Attorneys.
Peters v. The Paula, 1937 A. M. C. 988, 91 F. 2d 1001 (2nd Cir., 1937).
The Castilla, 1933 A. M. C. 81, 60 F. 2d 927 (2nd Cir., 1932).
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have the rights of domestic seamen." In war times, it was
sometimes unjust to say that a foreign seaman must go
home to his native country to receive compensation for
his injuries.
Since 1915, it has been lawful for foreign seamen to
break their contracts of employment while in United States
harbors and leave their ships, without penalty for mutiny
or for breach of contract." Few seamen actually do this,
because of fear of punishment when they return to their
own countries; and since 1935 the United States immigra-
tion-quota laws have also prevented many men from leav-
ing their ships."
The United States laws as to seamen's wages are of
serious importance to seamen (of whatever personal nation-
ality) serving in foreign flag ships, and to foreign ship-
owners. The United States laws do not allow a payment of
wages in advance; and any advances must be paid a second
time at the end of the period of work. They require one-
half the earned wages to be paid on demand in each port.
They forbid the payment of wages to any persons except
the seaman himself, or his wife, children and parents under
a strict allotment system.67 The penalty for failing to pay
wages promptly when due is the payment of double wages
for every day of delay - a heavy burden.68 Under these
laws, some Greek shipowners have had to pay double wages
in United States ports because they obeyed a decree of the
Greek Government (in exile in London) requiring them
to place a certain part of a Greek seaman's wages in a
special fund for the benefit of the families of Greek seamen
after the liberation of Greece from German occupation.69
"Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 1945 A. M. C. 1041, 151 F. 2d 132 (2nd Cir.,
1945) ; Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 1950 A. M. C. 352, 179 F. 2d 597 (2nd
Cir., 1950) ; contrary view in State court: Sonnesen v. Panama Transport
Co., 1949 A. M. C. 183, 298 N. Y. 262, 82 N. E. 2d 569 (1948).
0BmzicT, vol. 6, p. 21. Corresponding statute: Act of March 4, 1915;
38 Stat. 1184, 22 U. S. C. 258.
"Knauth: Alien Seamen's Rights and the War, 37 Am. J. Int. Law 74
(1943).
e1 Seamen's Allotment Law, June 26, 1884, amended Sept. 29, 1950; 46
U. S. C. 599 (b) ; 1950 A. M. C. 1939.
aWieder v. Isbrandtsen Co., 1950 A. M. C. -1586 (E. D. N. Y., 1950).
Kikllis v. Niarchos, 1949 A. M. C. 709 (N. Y. City Ct., 1949) ; The Capt.
K. Papazoglou, 1949 A. M. C. 1135, 175 F. 2d 730 (4th Cir., 1949) ; Heros v.
Cockinos, 1949 A. M. C. 2046, 177 F. 2d 570 (4th Cir., 1949) ; Loucopantis v.
Olympos, 1949 A. M. C. 2042, 177 F. 2d 785 (4th Cir., 1949).
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7. SovEmE cG MuraT
The United States and each of the States separately
assert the doctrine of sovereign immunity; they all refuse
to allow anyone to bring a lawsuit as a matter of right
against the State for damages done by public servants.
In 1915 for the first time the United States consented to
be sued in the ordinary courts as a shipowner; this law was
not satisfactory and a new law was enacted in 1920 ." Suit
is now permitted, but only in the federal courts, and with-
out the right of arrest or of security. The time for suit is
2 years, and this is strictly enforced.1 In 1925 the same
system was extended to "public" vessels, which in the main
means the ships of the Navy, Coast Guard and the Military
Transport fleet.1 2 These laws do not meet the commercial
demand for a right to sue a government in a foreign court;
but in this respect the attitude of the United States govern-
ment is not different from that of most governments. In
foreign ports, the American government stands upon its
claim of sovereign immunity, and consents to being sued
only ex gratia. Foreign citizens may not sue the United
States Government in the United States courts unless they
can demonstrate that an American citizen is allowed, vice
versa, to bring a suit against the foreigner's government in
the courts of his country. s
8. DEATH CLAIM
The situation concerning lawsuits for damages for a
negligent or civilly wrongful death has become absurdly
complicated. The federal admiralty judges unfortunately
long ago adopted the English view - derived from the old
English common law - that "death is the composer of
strife". This means that if one person negligently kills
another, the death of the victim is the end of all lawsuits.7'
There is no such doctrine in civil-law countries of Europe,
41 Stat. 525, 46 U. S. C. 741, 1946 A. M. C. 1286.
The Brazos-Eglantine, 1943 A. M. C. 23, 317 U. S. 395 (1943).
"43 Stat. 112; 46 U. S. C. 781; 1946 A. M. C. 1292.
"The Petar (Yugoslav-flag) 1948 A. M. C. 340, 165 F. 2d 738 (2nd Cir.,
1948).
1, RoErsoN, sec. 16; BENijicT, vol. 1, pp. 372-3.
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where lawsuits for negligent wounding and negligent kill-
ing are receivable without distinction. The English rule
was, most unjust, and was corrected in 1846 by Lord Camp-
bell's Act, which created a cause of action in the personal
representative of the deceased person for the benefit of
certain classes of his dependents.75 The various States have
all enacted similar laws, but with curious variations. Thus
the time limits for commencing suit vary from 1 to 2 years
in most States, to 6 years in one state - Michigan." And
19 States fix a maximum limit upon the amount that a
jury may give for a negligent death; these money limits
vary from $5,000 in Colorado to $20,000 in Connecticut.
These "death acts" apply to deaths in State territorial
waters." The reform was completed in 1920 by a federal
statute creating a right to sue for a wrongful death occur-
ing on the high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of any one of
the States; the federal time limit is 2 years, and there is no
money limit."s For the death of a seaman, Congress created
a special "death act" with a 3-year time limit which applies
both in State waters and on the high seas."'
As a result of public feeling about the course of the
litigation which followed upon the loss of the Titanic in
1912, a law was enacted which states that a shipowner may
not limit his liability in a United States court against claims
arising under the "death act" of a foreign country."e This
rule has an important effect upon the liabilities of foreign
shipowners whose vessels suffer a disaster on or near the
American coasts, or on the Great Lakes. A recent example
of the complicated working of this statute as to deaths at
"Lord Campbell's Act, 9 and 10 Victoria, c. 93 (1846).
" Louisiana -1 year: MeJia v. U. S., 1946 A. M. 0. 84, 152 F. 2d 686 (5th
Cir., 1945) ; Michigan - 6 years: Janes v. Sackman Bros. Co., 1950 A. M. C.
72, 177 F. 2d 928 (2nd Cir., 1949) ; Seamen under Jones Act (FELA) -
8 years: Riley v. Southern Trans. Co., 1950 A. M. C. 1695, 90 F. Supp. 842
(S. D. N. Y., 1950) ; Non-seamen, on high seas - 2 years: Sloand v. U. S.,
1950 A. M. C. 1063, 93 F. Supp. 83 (W. D. N. Y., 1950).
" Gill v. U. S., 1950 A. M. C. 1518, 184 F. 2d- 49 (2nd Cir., 1950) ; RoBINsoN.,
se. 17; BzNircTr, vol. 1, p. 39L
"41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. 761; RomwsoN, sec. 16; Bmiuucar, voL 1, p. 374,
382 395.
"41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. 688; discussed in Gill v. U. S., aupra, n. 77;
Bwmzor, voL 1, pp. 875, 394.
"The Titanic, 233 U. 5. 718 (1914) ; Federal Death on the High Seas by
Wrongful Act statute (1920), sec. 4, 46 U. S. C. 764. See n. 78, supra.
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sea is the Noronic case, discussed under the topic of limita-
tion of liability.
9. GENmmL AvERAG
It may be supposed that at least half of the general
average cases of modern days are caused by negligent
errors of navigation and management by the ship's per-
sonnel. In the last half of the 19th century the cargo in-
terests contended strongly that such negligence destroys
the ship's right to a general average.81 To meet that con-
tention and preserve the institution of General Average,
the Antwerp Rule 1903 was devised. This simply declares
that:
"Rights to contribution shall not be affected though
the event which gave rise to the sacrifice may have
been due to the fault of one of the parties to the
adventure. ..
This is now Rule D of the 1950 York-Antwerp Rules.
In the United States, however, the rule has long been
otherwise, and this remained unchanged even after the
Harter Act relieved the ship from liability for damage to
the cargo resulting from negligent navigation when due
care had been taken to make her seaworthy. However it
was held in the Jason that consistently with public policy
the parties to the shipping contract could by contract agree
that the ship should retain a right of general average in
spite of her negligence. Now the Ocean Bills of Lading
Convention and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act permit
such a bargain if the shipowner has used due diligence to
make the ship seaworthy, at and before the beginning of
the voyage. Therefore the result of Rule D may be obtained
by inserting a properly worded agreement in the bill of
' CoNqGvo, oN GENrAT AVerAGE (2nd ed., 1923), New York, chap. 2; The
Irrawaddy, 171 U. S. 187 (1898) ; The Strathdon, 94 Fed. Rep. 206 (D. C.
N. Y., 1899), affd. 101 Fed. Rep. 600 (2nd Cir., 1900); The Yucatan, (New
York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Ansonia Clock Co.), 139 Fed. Rep. 894 (S. D.
N. Y., 190) ; The Jason, 162 Fed. Rep. 56 (S. D. N. Y., 1908), on appeal 178
Fed. Rep. 414 (2nd Cir., 1910), and on final appeal 225 U. S. 32 (1912) ; The
Lackawanna, 220 Fed. Rep. 1002 (S. D. N. Y., 1915) ; Aktieselskabet Cuzco
v. The Sucarseco, 1935 A. M. C. 412, 294 U. S. 394 (1935).
1953]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIII
lading - the-so-called Jason Clause.n It must be inserted
in every bill of lading in every trade which runs to or
from the United States or passes near those shores; and
this is carefully required by the rules of all the P & I
underwriters."
It would of course be convenient if the Jason Clause
could be written into the York-Antwerp Rules as a part of
Rule D. Unfortunately the draftsmen of the 1950 Rules
were of the opinion that this should not be done; they per-
suaded themselves that the American policy of the Jason
litigation, settled now for over 60 years, is just an aberra-
tion in the views of a single country which should be cured
by local clauses in the trade of that country, and is not
proper for inclusion in a many-country text. The trading
of foreign-flag ships to the United States and of American-
flag ships to other countries would hardly seem to justify
such a colonial treatment of the Jason clause. Nor would
the great importance of the New York and San Francisco
and New Orleans insurance markets and their connected
activity in the business of stating general averages. How-
ever, every shipowner must continue to remember for him-
self to use this important clause in all his bills of lading.
10. LuMiTATiON OF SHnPowNE'S LLITy
The United States system is probably more complicated
than that of any other country, and an adequate descrip-
tion of it is beyond the purpose of this article. In general,
the shipowner surrenders the value of the ship plus the
freight for the voyage (if any), the ship being valued after
the disaster as she reaches the final port of the voyage.
When the ship sinks at sea, the liability is limited to zero,
or at most to the pending freight. All classes of claims rank
a The new Jason clause is found in the 3rd ed. of Knauth on Ocean Bills
of Lading, p. 96 (1947). The old Jason clause is in KNAUTH, Op. Cit., pp.
96, 136, 137, 254.
P & I stands for Protection & Indemnity, a type of marine liability in-
surance usually covering risks of liability for cargo damage, personal injury,
bridge and dock damage, the quarter-collision risk (if not elsewhere in-
sured), routine fines and penalties, all within the limits of shipowner's
limitation laws and agreements and within an over-all money limit. See
BEaNAuD: LzmouacE ON P & I INsURANcz (Kings Point Merchant Marine
Academy).
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together; but if there is not enough to pay out the life
claims, the shipowner (if his other resources are large
enough) must pay the life claims until his contribution
reaches $60 per ton of the ship's tonnage. The insurance
money for the hull and disbursements does not have to be
surrendered to the creditors." Under this system, more
than 27 possible results can be arrived at, depending on
the facts and relative values of the competing interests.
Shipowners are especially interested in the possibility
of combining limitation proceedings when they are sued
in different countries. There is at present no official method
of bringing a United States limitation proceeding into
legal relation with a lawsuit in a different country. Two
recent cases are of interest. The Canadian steamer Noronic
burned in the harbor of Toronto, Canada, and there was
loss of life. The owner was subject to suit in the port of
Cleveland, and many suits were brought there. Under the
Canadian limitation law, the owner claimed the right to
limit to $448,409. Under the United States statute, he could
claim the right to limit to $370,000. In his limitation peti-
tion filed in the federal admiralty court in Cleveland, he
cautiously furnished security for the larger Canadian
amount, and sought a ruling as to whether the law would
permit him to limit his liability to the somewhat lesser
United States amount. In the upshot, that question was not
answered, because a group settlement offer of $2,150,000
was worked out and accepted by 95 per cent of the damage-
claimants. The Noronic flew the flag of Canada; the Canad-
ian law limits the liability of a shipowner to $72.97 Canadian
(the former equivalent of £15 British Sterling) per ton for
death and injury liabilities. Canada allows a carrier to
contra'ct out of all liability. By suing the Canadian ship-
owner in the United States court, the death claimants
evaded the Canadian law and statute.8
" Proceedings for limitation of liability in U. S. courts is described in
detail in BmircT, voL 8, pp. 808-647. The statutes are in 46 U. S. C. 182-189.
See also KiqAuTH: OcrN Bxus or LADuNo.
0 The Noronic, 1950 A. M. C. 1499, 93 F. S. 549, 1950 A. X 0. 1840 (N. D.,
Ohio, 1950). Final solution of the Noronic case reported at 1962 A-. 3 .
(Sept.). The defendant shipowner offered a fund of $2,150,000 which was
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In the other case, the American steamer Norwalk Vic-
tory collided in the Scheldt with the British steamer Mer-
ganser, which sank with a valuable cargo; the Merganser
owner sued the Norwalk Victory in New York while the
cargo sued in England, and the Belgian port authorities
brought their wreck-removal claims in Belgium. Under
Belgian law the Norwalk Victory was entitled to limit all
these liabilities to 14,000,000 Belgian francs. But the owner
was compelled to pay all three claims in the three countries
where he was sued, without any consideration of the limita-
tion law of the place where the collision occurred. 6 In
effect, the law said he must pay his single limitation amount
three times over, once in Belgium, once in London, once in
New York.
These examples illustrate the unreasoned inter-action of
present-day isolationist national methods of dealing with
the liabilities of shipowners.
11. SOME COmPARISONS WrrH THE
COMMON LAW
It remains to enumerate several reasons why lawyers
and litigants prefer to seek legal relief in the United States
admiralty courts, instead of in the State courts or in a civil
suit in the federal courts, whose doors are also open to them
in most cases. 7
1. The admiralty courts can apportion fault and dam-
ages; the State courts and the federal courts in a civil pro-
ceeding cannot do this -- if they find that both parties are
at fault, they must refuse to give any relief." Their rule is
that any "contributory negligence" of a plaintiff is a com-
deposited with the court and divided pro rata among the damage-claimants
in accordance with their proofs of damage determined by a commissioner
appointed by the court; the offer was accepted by all the contesting damage-
claimants.
0 The Norwalk Victory - The Merganser, 836 U. S. 386 (1949). See com-
ments : Knauth: Renvoi and Some Related Problems, Internat. Bar Assn.,
(The Hague, 1948) ; Knauth: Renvoi and Other Conflict. Problems in Trans-
portation Law, 49 Col., L. Rev. 1 (1949).
' See Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F. 2d 834, 1952 A. M. C. 458 (1st Cir., 1952).
Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 889 (U. S., 1875) ; Belden v. Chase, 150
U. S. 674 (1893) ; Tolle v. Higgins Industries, 1947 A. M. C. 237, 25 So. 2d
744 (La., 1946) ; Gamw, sec. 252.
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plete defense for the defendant. This rule is especially
unsatisfactory in cases of maritime collision."9
2. A State court does not have the power to give a
decree in rem in respect of a ship or cargo in a private
litigation;90 this power in rem is reserved exclusively for
the federal admiralty court.
3. In a general sense, the policy of the common law is
to litigate the liability first, and afterwards assist the suc-
cessful party to seek the means of payment. The thought is
that the defendant and his property will remain in the
jurisdiction during the litigation and will remain solvent.
That of course is usually true when litigation concerns
lands and houses and domestic property. It is less true
when the lawsuit concerns money and credits. It is almost
never true when litigation concerns ships in the sea trades.
The admiralty court, with its process in rem and its attach-
ment process as a first step in the litigation, secures the
means of payment of the decree at the very commencement
of the lawsuit. This is well adapted to shipping cases when
the ship, her owner and the witnesses may sail away and
never return.
4. A common law court can ordinarily make an order
of sale transferring only such a title as the defendant hap-
pens to have, and such a sale may be questioned in many
other jurisdictions. Per contra, the admiralty court may
by decree order a sale or possession of the ship which will
be respected everywhere as good title to the ship. An in-
structive recent example is the case of the Varuna, where
an admiralty decree as to the true title to the vessel cut
SBelden v. Chase, supra, n. 88; Wolker v. Electric Ferries, Inc., 1936
A. M. C. 1551, 82 F. 2d 1023 (2nd Cir., 1936) ; Contra: The San Guiseppe -
The Sea Rover (Intagltata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co.), 1946
A. M. C. 263, 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 Pac. 2d 1 (1945) ; GErFiFN, secs. 251, 252.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared that it would follow theIntagliata decision and repudiated Belden v. Chase in Hedges v. United
Fruit Co., 1952 A. M. C. 1465 (2nd Cir., 1952).
1 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431 (U. S., 1867) ; GarrN, sec. 250;
ROBINSON, sec. 59; BENEDICT, sec. 17. State power to confiscate in specie in
the enforcement of State criminal and regulatory laws is demonstrated in
Hendry v. Moore, 1943 A. M. C. 156, 318 U. S. 133 (1943). Many commenta-
tors have confused the right to condemn the deodand in favor of the State
with the admiralty power to act upon a ship in rem in favor of one private
litigant as against another private litigant; the distinction however seems
quite clear.
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right through a state court and sheriff's attachment of the
vessel on the allegation that she was the property of an-
other person."
5. The admiralty method of taking testimony of sea-
going witnesses, de bene esse, on very short notice and with-
out arrangements for the expenses of opposing parties, is
well adapted to minimize delays in the movements of ships.
The State court and common law methods of taking deposi-
tions are much too slow and cumbersome for maritime
purposes. The same comment applies to the current federal
rules of civil procedure, which lay down times for notice
and action that are much too slow for maritime needs.
6. There is no uniformity of substantive law or of prac-
tice among the several States. While the general forms are
similar - even in Louisiana where the modern law derives
from the Code Napoleon - the variations of detail are as
numerous as those, for example, between the laws of Italy,
Switzerland, France, Spain and the Netherlands. The mari-
time law and practice has an immense attraction here, for
it is uniform throughout the United States.
This simple fact persuades litigants to seek legal relief,
if they can, in the less complicated system of admiralty
courts which administer a single body of law and pursue a
single scheme of practice.
7. In the admiralty courts in the United States, the
European litigant finds a system of law and of practice
which is derived from familiar Mediterranean sources.
While the modern variations are different in details, the
underlying theories are well known. But in the common
law courts of the States, he finds a law and practice derived
150 years ago from English common law, greatly changed
and modified by a vigorous independent growth, and strik-
ingly different from the legal systems of Europe and of
South America and of modern England.
9The Varuna is a striking illustration, with simultaneous proceedings in
New York State Courts in New York County (site of the debt), Kings
County (site of the vessel asset), 1st and 2nd Appellate Divisions, Eastern
District federal court and U. S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit.
Combined report at 1951 A. M. C. 1916.
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All of these reasons in combination impel litigants,
particularly foreign litigants who have matters in the
United States, to seek relief in the admiralty court to the
full extent of that court's jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
These paragraphs will indicate some of the more im-
portant characteristics of maritime law in the United States
today. In 1919 the United States emerged from the first
World War with a new fleet of about 2,000 ocean going
vessels, and at one bound had the second largest merchant
fleet of the globe. In 1945, at the end of the second World
War, it was in a position to give and sell hundreds of ships
to members of the United Nations whose merchant marines
had been reduced during the war, and nevertheless still
possessed more than 5,000 vessels, by far the greatest mer-
chant and military transport fleet of the world. This vigor.
ous maritime activity has stimulated many modifications
and changes in the maritime statutes and in the decisional
law of the American admiralty courts. The process of
growth and change continues now from year to year.
There is a constant and marked process of development
in progress, which both merits and necessitates a continu-
ing attention.92
"See Zels: AmKucAN SHIPPING PoLaY, (Princeton, 1938); consult the
Annual Surveys of American Law (New York University) 1942 to 1951.
essays on Admiralty Law and Transportation Law, by Knauth and Healy.
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